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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
37 P. 385, an attorney was penalized as for a contempt for what was
in effect a false statement of law, rather than of fact, in presenting
an affidavit for change of venue on tie ground of partiality of the
judge, where the statute did not authorize a change of venue on that
ground. F. W. F., '27.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DIVORCE - VOLUNTARY SEPA-
RATION.-Stitterson v. Stitterson, 131 S. E. 641, March 3, 1926.
This case arose in North Carolina under a statute providing for
the allowance of absolute divorce by either party upon showing of
(1) a separation lasting over a period of five years and (2) residence
by the plaintiff within the state during that period. Mrs. Stitterson
asked for a divorce under this statute, her husband having been sen-
tenced to the penitentiary for twenty years and having been in prison
for more than five years preceding the bringing of the action. North
Carolina does not allow divorce for a felony Committed by the other
party so that Mrs. Stitterson's right to divorce depended entirely upon
the statute. All these facts as stated and the plaintiff's required resi-
dence were proved. The- court held that the statute was not intended
to cover cases of "involuntary" separation; that, while the husband's
commission of the crime was certainly voluntary, yet the sentencing
of the husband was involuntary "and since this was the direct cause
of the separation, the separation must be deemed involuntary; that
therefore Mrs. Stitterson was not entitled to a divorce under and by
virtue of the statute.
Several other states (Kentucky, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, and
Louisiana) have statutes of a like nature. One of the statutes states
that the separation must be voluntary. In the other states it has been
decided by judicial decision that the separation must be voluniary
whether it is so provided by the statute or not. Ferguson v. Ferguson,
8 Ky. L. Rep. 428; Thompson v. Thompson, 53 Wis. 153. In Rhode
Island there has been no decision, to my knowledge, under the statute.
All of the courts have been very strict in construing these statutes,
prehaps because all* divorce statutes are in derogation of the common
law. McDougal v. McDougal, 5 Wash. 802: Olson v. Olson. 28 Pa.
Super. Ct. 128. Whatever the cause, the result has been that all courts
have decided that the separation must be voluntary and that whenever
possible the courts have decided disputed facts to indicate an involun-
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tary separation. Whether the separation or the length of separation has
been denied or not, it must be proved before the divorce will be grant-
ed. Gibbons v. Gibbons, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1214, 54 S. W. 710. Further-
more the separation must be mutually voluntary. Thompson v. Thomp-
son, 53 Wis. 153, 10 N. W. 166. But if the circumstances surrounding
the original separation are such as to indicate mutual desire for the
separation it will be presumed that the intention continued in the ab-
sence of proof to the contrary. Phillips v. Phillips, 22 Wis. 256. The
separation, however, must be shown to have been voluntary in its in-
ception (Sanders v. Sanders, 135 Wis. 613, 116 N. W. 176) and
throughout the statutory period required (Williams v. Williams, 122
Wis. 27, 99 N. W. 431 ; Sanders v. Sanders, supra). In this latter case
the court held that clippings to the effect that "woman kills self to
avoid divorce suit" and letters of the same kind, were more liable to
annoy than to effect a reconciliation and that consequently there was
nothing to show a lack of mutual desire for separation. When the wife
is forced to leave because of cruel treatment, although she left of her
own accord, such a separation is not considered voluntary. Jakubke v.
Jakubke, 125 Wis. 635, 104 N. W. 704. Likewise if one party has be-
come insane and has been placed in an asylum there is no voluntary
separation. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 428; Lee v. Lee, 182
N. C. 61, 108 S. E. 352. L. M: S.. '26.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - ORDINANCES - DELEGA-
TION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.-Ex Parte Cavanaugh
v. Gerk, Chief of Police, City of St. Louis. Missouri Supreme
Court, en banc, White, J. (about March 30, 1926). No. 26,936.
This case tested the validity of ordinances 32846 and 23926 of
the Code of the City of St. Louis. The first ordinance established the
Traffic Council; the second enumerated its powers and provided that its
regulations should constitute emergency law for a certain period, the
permanence of such regulations being dependent on ratification by the
Board of Aldermen. The Traffic Council was given power to pass
iules establishing one-way streets, erecting traffic signals, permitting
angle parking, etc., but the ordinances did not provide the conditions
under which these rules were to be passed. An extract of ordinance
23926, sec. (b) follows:
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